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BOOK REVIEWS
REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES. By Jack
B. Weinstein.* Ohio State University Press, Columbus, Ohio. 1977,
Pp. 216. Reviewed by Julius Isaacson.t
As the title of this well-annotated and indexed book suggests, its
author, Jack B. Weinstein, is not content with present rule-making
procedures of this nation's courts. His book first traces the historical
development of present day practices and then offers suggestions for
their improvement. Though disenchanted with the current rulemaking process, Judge Weinstein balances his concerns by calling
particular attention to the advantages of sound judicial rules, which
until now have allowed courts to meet growing administrative
pressures. He particularly notes the efficiencies that have been
achieved in the face of our nation's increasing resort to the
courtroom for resolution of complex, modern problems and the
flexibility of the courts in accommodating an increasing caseload.
Good rules, he observes, eliminate or reduce research time, procedural uncertainty, and appeals and reversals on non-substantive
points.
In a chapter on develop'ment of national rule-making power,
Judge Weinstein, who for six years by appointment of Chief Justice
Warren served on the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
Evidence, traces the evolution of rule-making power from early
English experience when the King used courts to expand his control
over nobility. He recounts, for example, the origin of the writ of
certiorari as the King's prerogative to review records of his courts,
and then details subsequent development leading to independence
for these common law and equity courts. Judge Weinstein does not
envision serio1,ls obstacles to further reform in this country as there
are no constitutional, theoretical, or historicai barriers to change. In
fact, as he carefully observes, the federal rule-making power is not
an inherent judicial power but is a power granted by Congress under
specific limitations.
Judge Weinstein is troubled principally by the undemocratic
way rule-making power has come to be exercised. In contrast, he
holds up the legislative enactment process where there are hearings
and debates, and the public is invited to present its views before a
bill is enacted into law. Yet, as Judge Weinstein points out, all of
these procedures are entirely lacking in the court rule-making
process in which judges get together, decide on rules and then
announce them as faits accomplis. He describes this as the
"impenetrability" of the court's rule-making process (p. 101). In
Judge Weinstein's opinion, there are now clear signals that changes
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are needed in the way rules for courts are developed. He argues that
ideology has succumbed to practicality and that both courts and
legislatures must assume an active role in the rule-making process.
Judge Weinstein defines court rule-making as the curious
phenomenon where courts control court procedure and related
matters by rules promulgated by the court and adds that such rulemaking is being exercised increasingly at national, state, and local
levels, the process presenting substantial advantages and serious
dangers. Believing that we are now at a crucial juncture, he devotes
the entirety of chapter four to his primary thrust, that is, methods of
achieving national rule-making reform. The author first discusses
congressional power to delegate and modify terms of delegation,
making reference to an early Supreme Court case l where for the first
time the Court's rule-making powers were reviewed and upheld as a
proper legislative delegation. This is followed by an interesting
analysis of the 1941 Sibbach v. Wilson & CO.2 case where the Court,
faced with the question of the validity of certain Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, held that Congress has undoubted power to regulate
the practice and procedure of federal courts either directly or by
delegation to the courts. The author then sets forth practical
objections to this unrestrained exercise of delegated rule-making
power by the Supreme Court and follows with proposals for
modification of the national rule-making process itself. One proposal
calls for the reinvolvement of the legislative branch in order to
restore some of the checks and balances originally established in our
democratic system. Judge Weinstein also supports three recommendations made by Professor Howard Lesnick, professor of law at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School: judicial conference procedures should be more open and should be published; the composition
of the advisory committees should be more representative; and the
assignment of the rule-promulgating role to the Supreme Court,
being unwise and inappropriate, should be r(!examined. The latter
recommendation is grounded in the author's belief that it is improper
for a body instrumental in the adoption of rules to be empowered to
pass upon the validity and constitutionality of those same rules. The
author is also critical of the individual federal courts which have
had rule-making power from their inception and where judges,
almost without exception, merely consult with one another in
promulgating local rules. The bar, law schools, and the citizenry are
given no opportunity to comment on proposed drafts of these local
rules. Since rules having a great impact on the public are involved
(e.g., jury size, sentencing policy, class action policy, media access,
bar admissions), democratization of the rule-making process here too
is a necessity (p. 119).
1. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1 (1825).
2. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
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In the close 'ofthis interesting text, Judge Weinstein summarizes
his own recommendations for change in the national rule-making
process: that the Supreme Court should not adopt any rules for any
court except itself; that Congress should continue to have the power
to reject any rule or amendment promulgated by the Court; that
Congress should refrain from redrafting details of a rule; that the
United States Judicial Conference should take the place of the
Supreme Court as the national rule-making authority and that the
Standing Committee should widely publicize the proposals of its
advisory committee and hold public hearings before recommending
adoption to the Judicial Conference. The author makes these
valuable recommendations to answer and eliminate justifiable
criticism of the local rule-making and guideline-making process.
The bench, bar, and general public should be deeply indebted to
Judge Weinstein for writing this book. Eventually his suggestions
for the reform of court rule-making procedures will be adopted or will
stimulate necessary change from which all will benefit. His book is
in harmony with the present, enlightened view that the public's
right to know extends to the rule-making power of the judiciary now
exercised in their inner chambers.

